

The Missouri Security Panel

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Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

February 15, 2002

The Honorable Bob Holden
Governor of Missouri
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

Dear Governor Holden:

Thank you for the opportunity you have given us to help define a secure future for Missouri.

You charged the Missouri Security Panel with the responsibility to conduct a broad review of homeland security preparedness. We are proud to transmit our findings and recommendations for your review.

The war America wages today against terrorism will not end the threat that future terrorists and weapons of mass destruction represent. The following goals will require your sustained support, the support of the General Assembly and the support of elected leaders across Missouri. We must build upon our capability to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorism. To do this we must cooperate to find innovative solutions and maximize resources. Our law enforcement must share intelligence to discover and disrupt any terrorist activity, foreign or domestic. Missourians must ensure that plans are in place and first responders are equipped, trained and ready. We must take steps to develop public-private partnerships to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure. We cannot afford to ignore the cyber threat and should form a public-private cyber coalition to work this issue. Finally, two of the most immediate and important challenges will be to more fully develop our defenses against bioterrorism and to educate the public to successfully cope with the realities and demands of the new security environment.

The terrorist attacks we suffered represent all that is evil. They were a vicious assault on our values and freedom. America's response has been historic and defining. We are heartened by the fact that Americans are resolved that this shall not change our way of life. Despite these new threats, we will find the means to preserve our freedom without building an American fortress.

We believe that the work of the Missouri Security Panel should continue and provide a means for you to establish focused "outcomes based" teams of public and private leaders to find innovative means to accomplish evolving security goals. We have enjoyed the opportunity to do this important work and volunteer to continue our efforts.

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The complete reports of the regional panels, the functional committees and their membership lists can be found at www.homelandsecurity.state.mo.us

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

"The higher priority we all now attach to homeland security has already begun to ripple through the land. The Government of the United States has no more important mission than fighting terrorism overseas and securing the homeland from future terrorist attacks. This effort will involve major new programs and significant reforms by the Federal government. But it will also involve new or expanded efforts by State and local governments, private industry, non-governmental organizations and citizens. By working together we will make our homeland more secure."¹

As we, the citizens of Missouri, determine our approach to homeland security, we should preserve the ideas, the values and the virtues that represent America while working to make it as safe from terrorism as possible. Unfortunately, the very freedoms that we enjoy as Americans also make us vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Americans and Missourians should not expect perfect security because the government cannot provide it and preserve our current freedoms. We need to learn to live with some risk of terrorism. Steps can be taken to protect Missouri against the most serious of terrorist dangers. We can strive to protect public health and prevent the consequences of bioterrorism. We can protect our most sensitive facilities. We can ensure that all levels of law enforcement communicate and share information. We can restore the sense of neighborhoods and community. This report describes steps we should consider to make life in Missouri more secure while preserving our quality of life.

In November 2001, Governor Bob Holden appointed the Missouri Security Panel as part of his homeland security initiative. The Governor charged the Panel with the task of examining security within Missouri and submitting their findings. The thirty-three member panel presented their reports to Governor Holden on January 25, 2002.

In order to facilitate the process of gathering information and developing recommendations for the Governor within a short period of time, the Missouri Security Panel members also served on one of seven committees or one of two urban area panels, which examined specific areas more closely. The East-West Gateway Council supported the St. Louis Regional Security Panel, and the Kansas City Metropolitan Area Panel received support from the regional emergency management team of the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) in Kansas City. In addition, seven committees investigated the following functional areas: Public Health, Medical and Environment; Government Operations and Facilities; Transportation; Utilities; Critical Technologies; First Responders; and

¹ Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation, President George W. Bush, FY2003 Budget, Budget Office, Washington DC, Feb 2002, page 3.

Public Awareness and Public-Private Partnerships. This report is the product of thousands of hours of dedicated volunteers.

Common Observations of the Missouri Security Panel

As the Missouri Security Panel gathered information and received reports from the urban panels and functional committees, several recommendations were reoccurring throughout each report.

Communication

The lack of an interoperable communication system among the federal, state and local governments impedes effective response to a disaster or terrorist attack. During a disaster or attack, our law enforcement, fire services, public health, medical providers, and other emergency management services are charged with immense and complicated tasks. To effectively respond, our First Responders must have the necessary tools to communicate and share information. Interoperable communications are a must.

Equally important as the actual system used for communication is the ability to communicate a consistent and clear message to a large public before, during, and after a terrorist attack. Educating the public before any attack is crucial to obtaining their full cooperation and to minimizing panic. Effective communication is two-way between governments, between a government to the people, from the people to the government and includes the media.

Public Health

The threat of bioterrorism is a reality. The current preparedness of our public health system and providers is good, but not adequate for the challenges of bioterrorism. We must prepare now. Our public health infrastructure needs to be increased. The ability of hospitals to accept large numbers of sick or injured and to surge, must be improved. We should organize and prepare regionally against this serious threat.

Critical Asset Protection

There are certain facilities and assets within Missouri that are critically important. These structures may be historic or symbolic, host large gatherings, are symbolic, contain critical technology, or provide services that are extremely important to thousands. These are the facilities that must be protected from

terrorist attack. These facilities are often privately held and require the cooperation of owner/operators to enhance their security. These facilities need to be identified and the owner/operator of the facility contacted to develop protocols with the state to provide for enhanced protection during periods of threat. The establishment of a Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP) will establish protocols without violating the owner/operators requirements for secrecy.

Critical Technology

Similar to the protection of critical assets is the need to protect cyber-based technology. Computer based technology is a part of the fabric of our lives. Cyber terrorism is an under-appreciated and extremely serious threat that crosses all boundaries. Not only are we concerned about protecting our information and cyber-controlled services, but we must also be concerned with the physical protection of facilities that are critical to these systems. Critical technology vulnerabilities must be identified and strengthened.

Public-Private Partnerships

Defending against terrorism requires completely new levels of public-private partnership and cooperation. Building public-private partnerships now will benefit everyone in the future. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of both will help these sectors complement each other and provide for a united front against terrorism.

Funding

The need for funds to improve preparedness is a reality that will need to be faced by all those involved. Several of the recommendations presented may not require funding; however, many of the recommendations do. All levels of government must accord the efforts to counter terrorism the proper priority and we must meet the budgetary challenges of today to be prepared for tomorrow. We need a commitment to cooperate and innovate together, and overcome the challenge of budget implications for both state and local government.

The federal government is putting together the strategies, plans and funding to assist states to improve their levels of preparedness. They are not going to pay for everything but over several years Missouri will receive a significant amount of money. State and local government will have to find funds to hire additional people and to maintain the readiness of the equipment that the federal government will fund.

The End of the Beginning

We have crossed a threshold of violence that is new to America. The dimensions of future terrorist threats against Missouri will remain unclear. Soon, other events will intervene and shift the focus of our attention. The window of opportunity to establish goals, strategies and systems designed to work steadily behind the scenes to improve preparedness and reduce our most serious vulnerabilities is open today but it may soon close.

Since September 11th we have been paying the costs of not being prepared, and they are too high.

INTRODUCTION

Homeland Security and Missouri

As you read the report, keep in mind that ...

Missouri is a safe and secure home in the heartland of America ... It is a great place to live and raise a family.

Missouri has worked effectively for years to provide a secure and safe environment for its citizens; and Missouri will be at the forefront of future efforts.

The citizens of Missouri are adapting, determined to preserve freedom and their way of life.

Missouri is a vital crossroad of American economy and culture; a diverse, prosperous and welcoming home to millions. Because of these characteristics, Missouri may be a target and must be prepared to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from terrorism. Missourians should not overreact in the face of these new dangers. Missourians can help by cooperating and working in their neighborhoods and communities to make them better and more secure. This is the most immediate and meaningful way for us to work together to improve security.

Because enemies of the United States cannot defeat our military, they will try to destroy our confidence by attacking the symbols of our government, large public gatherings, the economy, the environment, our food supply and perhaps other unimagined areas of potential vulnerability. The major threat to Missouri is the potential for the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These include nuclear or radiological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical, and enhanced conventional weapons. Other significant threats include cyber attack and conventional attack using explosives or arms against critical infrastructure and technology to deny service.

These threats require all levels of government to closely coordinate and integrate homeland security plans and programs. There are numerous potential vulnerabilities in our society. Working together, federal, state and local governments will improve preparedness against an enemy that may never materialize. However, we must proceed on the assumption that terrorism could strike here in Missouri. The challenge is large but we can do it. Government at all levels must be prepared to share the costs of protecting the people. Missouri's significant homeland security challenges are not unique. All the states

and territories share many of the same challenges and there are no quick fixes. The strategy, roles, and funding solutions require the cooperation of federal, state, and local governments and private sector.

“Effective preparedness for combating terrorism – planning, training, exercises, and operational structures – requires a fully-integrated network of Federal, State, and local organizations.”²

The recommendations of the Missouri Security Panel are but the first step to identifying and prioritizing the requirements. The recommendations of this report should be closely reviewed. Those that merit adoption should be funded and enacted. However, it is unlikely that we will ever be completely satisfied with our preparation. Homeland security is a journey of constant discovery and improvement. We need to have the commitment to work together.

Purpose of the Missouri Security Panel

The first purpose of the Panel is to seek ways and means to improve communication on homeland security issues and programs.

The second purpose of the Panel is to conduct a security audit, identifying critical assets within Missouri and proposing a dynamic system to improve security. The panel is to recommend the criteria for the selection of critical infrastructure and identify how state and local authorities can gain the cooperation of the private sector in a Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP).

The third purpose of the Panel is to propose recommendations for improvements to public safety and identify any immediate leadership decisions (legislative, funding, policy, procedures) to enhance Missouri’s homeland security.

Members of the Missouri Security Panel

The following individuals, many of whom volunteered their time and effort, are deeply appreciated for their contributions, for their collaborative spirit, and for their determination to accomplish this work.

Mayor Joe Adams
Judge Nannette Baker
Mayor Kay Barnes
Ms. Harriett Beard

University City
St. Louis
Kansas City
Kirksville

² Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 15 December 2001, page 6.

Mayor Thomas Carlson	Springfield
Senator Harold Caskey	Butler
Mr. Timothy Daniel	Columbia
Dr. Maureen Dempsey	Jefferson City
Chief Richard Easley	Kansas City
Chief Sherman George	St. Louis
Mr. Henry Hungerbeeler	Jefferson City
Mr. Charles Jackson	Jefferson City
Representative Connie Johnson	St. Louis
Mr. Al Kemp	Kansas City
Dr. Richard Kurz	St. Louis
Representative Kenneth Legan	Halfway
Ms. Joyce Murphy	Jefferson City
Ms. Jan Newton	St. Louis
The Honorable Jay Nixon	Jefferson City
Mr. Gary Rainwater	St. Louis
Senator John Russell	Lebanon
Ms. Katheryn Shields	Jackson County
Brigadier General Dennis Shull	Lamonte
Commissioner Kelvin Simmons	Jefferson City
Mr. Tom Simon	Jefferson City
Mayor Francis Slay	St. Louis
Mr. Don Stamper	Columbia
Colonel Roger Stottlemire	Jefferson City
Mr. Jerry Uhlmann	Jefferson City
Mr. Steve Waters	Jefferson City
Mr. Buzz Westfall	St. Louis County
Chief Doug Westhoff	Columbia
Mr. Gerry Wethington	Jefferson City

We also acknowledge and appreciate the tremendous efforts of the many other Missouri citizens who volunteered and contributed to this effort as committee and regional panel members. These individuals are recognized within their respective committee and regional panel reports found at:

www.homelandsecurity.state.mo.us

GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The chair of the Missouri Security Panel submits the following general findings and recommendations.

1. During periods of crisis, public awareness and cooperation are vital. The trust and confidence of Missourians in their government must be preserved. We have a responsibility to our children to prepare them to live in a world where very bad things can and sometimes do happen; but the chances of anyone being touched by terrorism are very small. Individual Americans and their families are not the targets of terrorism. Nevertheless, information and education directed towards Missourians before, during and after emergencies is vital to enhancing their ability to cope with crisis, to understand the potential dangers, and to live confident and free in this new environment. We must establish forums for the exchange of information and opinions. We must have adequate warning systems. First responders must be able to communicate with each other and the state needs to have redundant communications systems for periods of emergency.

Missouri should ensure that effective communications and warning systems, the ways and means for the exchange of information (two-way communications), and educational programs exist between governments, first responders (emergency communications statewide and to facilitate mutual aid), the media, the public and especially in our schools. Schools should include appropriate emergency training in their curriculum.

2. Americans are more alert now and must remain so. All Americans have a role to play in the war on terror. Since the September attacks, Missouri's owners and operators of material or equipment that might be used to harm Americans have acted to reduce the possibility of these dangerous items from falling into evil hands. This has a significant and positive impact on safety and security within Missouri.

Owners and operators of facilities where large numbers of Americans gather to work and play must continue to work to provide as safe and secure an environment as reasonable, and owners and operators of hazardous equipment or materials must safeguard their property.

3. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request includes \$3.5 billion to be distributed to the states for improvements in the preparedness of First Responders. \$19.6 million in federal fiscal year 2002 funds will come to Missouri to improve bioterrorism defense. To qualify for Missouri's portion of these funds,

Governor Holden must approve and submit a plan to the federal government demonstrating how Missouri will contribute to the realization of national goals. To effectively share scarce resources and maximize the utilization of these funds, the federal government wants the states to work with their cities and counties to establish regional collaborative agreements among cities and counties to come together to plan for and to manage emergencies as regional teams

Missouri should establish multi-disciplinary state teams to focus on the preparedness, coordination and integration needs of standardized regions within the state of Missouri. Perhaps the most pressing need within the state is to improve our emergency medical capacity in each region. A standardized regional approach, consistent for all state departments involved in emergency support, will facilitate assessments of current preparedness, coordination, planning, training and exercises. A standardized regional approach will help in the identification of efficient and innovative ways to assist the regions to work collaboratively to improve their preparedness level and for the state to provide support. Missouri should focus planning, training and exercise efforts for regions consistent with the current organization of the nine regions of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Missouri should then encourage the cities and counties of these nine regions to work together to plan and share assets and to establish sound mutual aid agreements. Each region will have different realities and the state must be prepared to assist each region to meet their unique needs. Under this concept, all departments involved in emergency planning would focus their support by region.

4. Individual Missourians want to volunteer and Missouri's volunteer based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are an important asset. Missouri's State Emergency Management Agency does a great job at coordinating the activities of volunteer NGOs. State and local government should take action to facilitate how individual volunteers might be organized and trained to assist where they live.

Missouri should also seek ways to help communities promote volunteerism and continue to use NGO volunteer organizations to their full potential.

5. Because of the events of September 11th, all law enforcement agencies at federal, state and local levels must effectively communicate and share intelligence to counter a terrorist threat. Law enforcement from federal to local levels must work as a team in the gathering and sharing of intelligence.

All urban and the more populated area law enforcement agencies in Missouri should be a part of the Missouri State Police Intelligence Network (MOSPIN) and actively help to make this network a success. The Missouri Highway Patrol will have to be proactive in sharing intelligence with our

smaller law enforcement agencies representing local governments or rural communities that may choose not to be a part of MOSPIN.

6. Public and privately owned and operated infrastructure assets are key and essential to the welfare of the public and the economy. One goal of domestic or foreign terrorists may be to deny the service that these facilities provide by initiating either cyber attacks or physical attacks. This recommendation is directed to reduce the vulnerability to physical attacks. Steps to protect critical infrastructure assets from physical or cyber attacks are the responsibility of the owner/operators. However, there is a need for plans to be in place to rapidly and effectively reinforce the security of owner/operators with police or the National Guard. This will require public-private cooperation and processes that do not reveal sensitive information important to private owner/operators.

The Missouri National Guard, in cooperation with the Missouri Highway Patrol and owner/operators across the state, should establish a Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP). During a period of increased threat, the plan would enhance or reinforce the security of the most important and sensitive facilities in Missouri.

TOP FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REGIONAL PANELS AND FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEES

Kansas City Metropolitan Area Panel

1. A lack of personal protective equipment (PPE), detection and monitoring equipment, decontamination equipment and pharmaceuticals reduces the capability of first responders to combat terrorist activity. These are important tools to successfully protect the citizens of the Kansas City area and throughout the state.

Grants should be provided to local governments to purchase equipment and resources required to enhance local emergency response capabilities and to replace used or expired items. Funding to support on-going training on the use of and maintenance of this equipment is also required.

2. Public health agencies in the Kansas City metropolitan area do not have adequate personnel to undertake surveillance, investigation and service delivery in response to a major bioterrorism event.

Resources should be provided to local public health departments to add trained personnel to investigate suspicious incidents, to plan and deliver services, to analyze samples and to communicate with local officials and the public. In particular, epidemiologists are needed to assist with critical early surveillance, investigation and warning and dedicated public information officers are needed to communicate with the public.

3. Existing systems to provide metropolitan area public health, health care and emergency services personnel with early information on the presence of biological agents are not adequate. The surveillance system should feature fully automated data collection and analysis from EMS agencies, hospitals and other health care providers. The system should also automatically notify appropriate public health and emergency services officials of unusual increases in certain medical symptoms.

Expand the computerized early warning and surveillance system developed by the Kansas City, MO Health Department and the Metropolitan Ambulance Services Trust (MAST) to cover the entire region so that local health departments, hospitals and first responders can be alerted in a timely manner of an unusual increase in medical symptoms that could indicate a bioterrorism event.

4. Many counter-terrorism planning, training and equipping efforts subsequent to September 11th, including this one, have been mandated without the provision of additional resources to accomplish them. Accordingly, important planned work to prepare for natural hazards, especially in those jurisdictions and regions that have already been actively planning against terrorism, has had to be delayed or abandoned. Continued emphasis on counter-terrorism, without additional funding and staff, may place our residents at greater risk from natural and other non-terrorism related hazards.

Immediately identify funding to assist local jurisdictions in planning, preparing for and responding to terrorist events. Specifically, allow grant funds, both currently awarded and those to be awarded, to be used for hiring additional staff to assist with the current workload. Develop and promulgate a multi-year work plan to allow local jurisdictions to incorporate national and state preparedness needs into their programs without undue hardship on existing work plans, budgets, staffs and the public we serve.

5. The added complexities associated with planning and responding to acts of terrorism warrants a comprehensive training program coordinated among all levels of government and all relevant agencies. The fruits of coordinated training need to be evaluated on a regional basis. Accordingly, we need planning, organizing and monetary support for full-scale exercises to test coordinated plans and procedures and to discover weaknesses that can then be addressed.

The appropriate federal or state agency should provide funding and planning support to local governments and regional organizations to develop and execute comprehensive exercises to evaluate regional counter-terrorism planning. State and federal agencies should commit to realistically participate in these exercises. Exercises should be developed at the local and regional level, with state and federal support, thereby paralleling the planning function with the way we are expected to respond.

6. Most, if not all, Top Off (Top Official) Exercises failed in the area of inter- and intra-jurisdictional coordination. Many reasons were cited but most boiled down to the fact that either there was no appropriately sized, equipped and staffed Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) from which to conduct coordinated operations, or the major players could not agree to a single location from which to conduct coordinated operations. As we continue to improve our regional ability to respond to acts of terrorism, and incorporate new or developing interoperability procedures with state and federal entities, it becomes ever more important to have a suitable facility from which to coordinate activities in support of the principal responding agencies. A recent report by the International Association of Emergency Managers to the National Association of Counties Homeland Security Task Force stated the following: "If local communities are

truly expected to be the first line of protection in the new 'Homeland Defense' system, they must be properly equipped to facilitate efficient and effective decision-making in an adequate Emergency Operations Center (EOC)."

Build or designate facilities for regional coordination of emergency operations. Provide federal funding for facility improvements that will allow local EOCs to be equipped to accommodate representatives from all agencies and organizations involved. Provide federal funding to develop or procure virtual information management systems to link all of the appropriate agencies.

St. Louis Regional Security Panel

1. The St. Louis Region needs to train, prepare and exercise as a cohesive regional response team.

Expand the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Hazardous Materials/ WMD Terrorist Training Program to the entire region and conduct a multi-jurisdictional/ multi-agency Integrated Emergency Management Exercise program.

2. Reduce the vulnerability to government networks and information systems.

Establish technology standards to reduce the threat of cyber-terrorism and improve security in and around government information systems.

3. Reduce the vulnerability to water treatment and storage systems.

Invest in security enhancements to water treatment plants and storage reservoirs including hardening facilities, enhanced security features and upgrades to pumping systems to allow redundancies of water delivery systems.

4. Improve communication and the exchange of information between the public and government.

Funding should be provided to develop and maintain a communication program to educate the public on issues related to terrorism, bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism prevention, preparedness and response. Program should include print, web and video information tools.

5. Additional personal protective equipment (PPE), training, detection and monitoring equipment, decontamination equipment and pharmaceuticals are needed to enhance capabilities of the health care community.

Grants should be provided to local governments to purchase equipment or other resources required to enhance local emergency response capabilities and to replace used or expired items. Funding to support on-going training on the use of this equipment is also required.

6. The heightened alert level is draining financial resources of local jurisdictions at the expense of other programs, in many cases with the potential to cause a negative impact on public safety.

Immediately identify funding to assist local jurisdictions in planning, preventing and preparing for a terrorist attack. Funding should be flexible and directed to local agencies. Long-term plans and funding programs need to be developed to allow gradual incorporation of preparedness and prevention efforts without undue hardship on existing plans, budgets, staff and the public.

Public Health, Medical and Environment

1. Public health providers lack the training and resources for responding to a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. State and local disaster plans are not integrated. Serious problems will surface if any interruption in the transportation of supplies, food, pharmaceuticals and equipment occurs.

Develop multi-disciplinary training and plans to address all facets of a terrorist attack. The planning should incorporate collaboration among federal, state and local governments' disaster plans and procedures. A plan for transportation of necessities should also be addressed.

2. Public health providers do not have an adequate system of surveillance for early detection of bioterrorism. Furthermore, the public health system does not have a strong enough infrastructure of employees and providers to assist during a terrorist attack or bioterrorism attack.

Improve data collection and analysis of health information. Expand and improve the High Alert Surveillance System (HASS). Monitor pharmaceutical providers and increase training about reportable diseases for private providers. Strengthen the public health infrastructure by improving recruitment and retention of trained epidemiologists. Collaboration with schools of public health and veterinary schools to

promote these medical professions is important to having trained and educated professionals in adequate numbers.

3. Missouri does not maintain a stockpile of pharmaceuticals, and access to the federal supply would be slow during an attack. The health care delivery system is not prepared to handle a large and sudden influx of sick or injured. Treatment facilities, staff, and supplies are inadequate for events with mass casualties. There isn't a good effective way to keep track of the status and location of professional health care providers, patients, victims, volunteers and the deceased within the system.

Develop, train and support state response teams organized in a regional manner to provide assistance within a particular region of the state; develop plans to address isolation and quarantine; and develop a statewide network of providers to respond to and educate communities.

4. If we were attacked with bioterrorism, the communication between federal, state and local levels of government and the public would be inadequate. First responders, healthcare providers, law enforcement, fire departments and emergency management need to understand the requirements for and improve information sharing.

Develop a system to inform all the stakeholders, public and private, in a timely manner.

5. Response infrastructure may not be secure during a terrorist attack. Inadequate threat assessments for primary or secondary exposure to a biological agent would likely place Missouri's citizens at risk. Physical facilities are designed with open egress and ingress. Normal response facilities may be contaminated and rendered inoperable or non-functioning during a bioterrorism attack.

Determine which critical systems have high exposure for potential disruption during a terrorist attack and develop plans to limit or regulate access to certain facilities. Finally, conduct an analysis of the facilities vulnerabilities.

First Responders

1. Various levels of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness for First Responders exist throughout the state because there is no state-mandated WMD requirement for First Responders.

Establish a panel of subject matter experts in various disciplines to provide recommendations for legislation in the development of criteria, which

will make HazMat/WMD Awareness training a required component at all recruit training for First Responders. Establish a state statute mandating appropriate oversight agencies to manage all components of First Response. Establish a state system of recognized HazMat/WMD components/equipment, including that which is needed for structural collapse rescue, SWAT/SERT resources, K-9 resources, and others that meet criteria prescribed by the Department of Public Safety. Also, further develop a statewide HazMat/WMD coordination plan and SOP's for recognized components. Finally, provide additional funding to increase training opportunities and exercises for recognized components.

2. Most First Responders, including Hospital Emergency Room personnel, are NOT provided personal protective equipment for a HazMat/WMD event.

Identify the needs of First Responder agencies and prioritize and provide needed equipment to police, fire, and EMS First Responders as well as hospital ER staff.

3. Most communities/jurisdictions have not performed a terrorism risk/vulnerability assessment on which to base planning for response to a HazMat/WMD event.

The State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) should adopt a standard terrorism risk assessment model and provide guidance to local jurisdictions on risk/vulnerability assessment and provide training to local jurisdictions on how to conduct a terrorism risk/vulnerability assessment. Consider a legislative mandate that would direct the chief elected official of each jurisdiction to modify their local Emergency Operations Plan to address terrorism response based on threat assessment and direct SEMA to provide guidance on completion of threat assessment and development of the terrorism response plan.

4. Inter- and Intra-Agency interoperable communications abilities need to be improved and expanded throughout Missouri.

The State Highway Patrol should form a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary "State Interoperability Executive Committee" that will develop guidelines for the use of a dedicated interoperability spectrum. The Department of Public Safety should aggressively promote the development of interoperable communications by exploring state and federal funding opportunities for acquisition of equipment and provide funding assistance to agencies desiring to upgrade radio equipment to create a platform compatible for use with dedicated interoperability channels. Bring wide area interoperable communications to local, state, and federal users within Missouri by committing to researching and building a statewide wireless network that can support state and local needs, possibly using the 700 MHz Spectrum.

5. There is a lack of training in the Incident Management System throughout Missouri for all agencies with a role to respond to terrorism.

Conduct “Train-the-Trainer” classes on ICS/IMS. Integrate ICS/IMS training into all First Responder recruit training. Furthermore, revise the state response plan to reflect the ICS/IMS structure and integrate it with the Federal Response Plan.

6. There is no coordinated large-scale pre-hospital response capability in Missouri.

Establish a panel to coordinate existing pre-hospital response resources. Elevate at least one existing medical resource to statewide response capability.

Critical Technologies

1. The threats to cyber technology present a serious challenge for safeguarding critical assets in Missouri. To provide continuity in both the private and public sectors, the functioning of our cyber based systems and the physical safeguarding of critical cyber facilities must be protected from terrorist attacks.

The Critical Technologies Committee and state agencies should establish a security preparedness baseline for each key critical technology infrastructure and seek the completion of the self-assessment of critical assets by public and private owner/operators.

2. There is a strong need for the creation of a cyber coalition with single points of contacts within the public and private sectors to establish and communicate action plans for natural or man-made disasters. The cyber coalition should establish an awareness program to insure that top corporate leaders and state policy makers fully understand the critical impact that cyber terrorism could have on the economy of Missouri.

Establish a Missouri cyber coalition to consist of private and public sector representatives to document and maintain a Missouri Emergency Communications Plan in support of cyber security and business continuity preparedness.

3. Challenges related to critical technologies can affect the state of Missouri as a whole. Communication among various entities within Missouri will assist in meeting the needs of the state in preparation for and response to a terrorist attack.

The Critical Technologies Committee, the chairs of the other Missouri Security Panel committees and the St. Louis and Kansas City regional panels should continue to meet to discuss and identify concerns within their committees regarding the risks associated with critical technologies and refine the protection of critical cyber assets.

4. Cyber technology is constantly changing. This presents unique challenges to protecting the public and private sectors against terrorism. Almost all aspects of the public and private sectors are critically dependent upon technology.

Updates or reviews should occur once or twice a year to monitor the progress toward implementation of the baseline recommendations for each identified key asset within the Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP).

5. Detailed security plans for protecting cyber technology will contain sensitive information that if disclosed would place at risk all the security efforts.

Pursue legislative initiatives to support the confidentiality of private sector obligations, protect the public sector from undue risk, and prepare for Internet influencing legislation.

Transportation

The Transportation Committee emphasizes that a sound transportation system is important to all aspects of security issues.

1. Transportation facilities have differing security levels. There are no standard criteria for determining which facilities are secure.

Develop appropriate criteria for evaluating the security of transportation assets. Security assessments of transportation facilities should be conducted statewide.

2. Confidential security information on critical transportation assets cannot be adequately protected from public disclosure. Identified structural weaknesses would provide the foundation for a terrorist attack.

Review ways to keep secure confidential information on critical transportation assets.

3. Communication between federal, state and local agencies regarding threats to specific facilities is lacking. Transportation facility owners need to be aware of threats. There must also be some structure to make sure citizens in potentially affected areas are quickly made aware of threats. Identification and

contact information of the owner and operators of transportation assets does not exist. The owner/operator of these facilities will need to be identified and this information should be provided to the Missouri State Highway Patrol who can notify them of any specific threat. Threat information should also be provided to MoDOT so that the department will be cognizant of any different requirements for managing the affected parts of the transportation system.

Develop a threat level system to give asset owners an indication of the level of security measures they need to take for a specific threat. We encourage transportation facility owners to develop a working relationship with local police and federal officials.

4. State agency transportation resources and expertise are not organized in a structure similar to federal agencies responsible for safety and security of transportation.

Conduct a study of the feasibility and options for creating a centralized location for statewide transportation security.

5. A statewide transportation operations center is needed to monitor and coordinate emergency response and incident management. Information about highways, rail, public transportation, aviation and port information is not collected, coordinated, and communicated with applicable authorities and the public.

Construct a statewide transportation operations center, which will link to other centers and agencies, both public and private. An assessment of communication links should be conducted to ensure that the basic means of communication would be in place if phones or radios weren't working or available. We recommend the involvement of law enforcement and emergency medical services in the development and implementation phase of this project. Finally, we recommend the implementation of Intelligent Transportation Systems technology where appropriate on all systems.

Utilities

1. By their very design, utility systems are vulnerable to terrorist attack. However, the specific points of vulnerability are difficult to determine. Identifying the critical assets of utility systems is equivalent to identifying these points of vulnerability. There is a need to protect this information because knowledge of these vulnerable points and critical assets could provide a "roadmap for terrorists."

Critical assets of utility systems should not be identified in the Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP) or any other report prepared by the

Missouri Security Panel. We also recommend that each utility in Missouri develop its own internal list of critical assets and security guidelines. We also recommend that a contact person at each utility in Missouri be identified to coordinate with state and local officials if a specific threat is made.

2. Missouri utility companies who responded to the Public Service Commission (PSC) survey indicated preparedness for a variety of types of emergencies.

All Missouri utilities should be encouraged to review the Best Practices list and, where applicable, adopt those items they are not currently performing.

3. Security at the Callaway Nuclear Plant is adequate. As a result of September 11, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is expected to develop additional security requirements for nuclear power plants.

Continue compliance with all requirements set by the NRC and Congress.

4. Some utilities in Missouri do not currently carry a disinfectant residual throughout their water distribution systems. This leaves the system with little or no defense against contamination, either accidental or intentional.

All water utilities serving 10,000 or more people should be required to maintain a disinfectant residual throughout the distribution system as a means to reduce risk during a terrorist attack.

5. An explosion of sufficient magnitude could breach dams at hydroelectric power plants.

Conduct a study to determine if truck, van, and/or other traffic across dams should be restricted.

Government Operations and Facilities

1. To prepare for and to protect Missouri and its citizens from a terrorist attack, a list of all critical assets needs to be compiled to accurately educate Missouri's government about possible weaknesses within Missouri.

Create and maintain an up-to-date list of state owned facilities and other major facilities and assets in Missouri compiled by OA and the Highway Patrol as part of an overall Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP) and maintain the list through a cooperative effort of the Office of

Administration, Highway Patrol, Missouri National Guard and the State Emergency Management Agency.

2. In order to determine which assets qualify as critical, criteria were developed to help determine where the state places its security efforts in times of crisis. The use of these criteria as a part of the Critical Asset Protection Plan (CAPP) will allow the executive branch to maximize protection and security while ensuring a prudent use of limited resources. With the use of these criteria, decisions can be made in a time of crisis in an orderly and rational manner based on the threat at hand and the rational needs for protection.

Use the criteria developed by the Government Operations and Facilities Committee to ensure prudent use of limited resources to maximize protection and security efforts at the state level and make these criteria available for use by local governments.

3. Following violent and tragic school incidents at Columbine High School in Colorado and other locations, many schools have developed a closer working relationship with law enforcement. This should continue to be fostered and encouraged, and schools that have not developed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) should do so. The committee has provided guidance for accomplishing this task by listing items to be considered and an example of an MOU.

Develop a MOU between school districts, local law enforcement agencies and local emergency management coordinators to provide response guidelines for terrorist attacks as well as other violent school attacks and emergency situations.

4. Several areas of Missouri law need to be strengthened to assist in the fight against terrorism.

Enact legislative changes in Missouri to provide better protection against terrorist acts through improved intelligence and stronger criminal laws.

5. To ensure continuity in government, state agencies should work in coordination with SEMA and OA to establish and/or update safety plans that include response guidelines in the event of a terrorism attack or other emergency situation. These plans should include contingencies for backup of essential data in off-site locations and appropriate personnel contact numbers. Safety and terrorism response training should be provided for appropriate personnel.

Complete an annual statewide readiness drill by September 10th.

Public Awareness and Public-Private Partnerships

1. Currently no common points of contact exist in the state between the public, government and media. Messages communicated prior to and during a terrorist incident would likely be inconsistent and confusing. The state of Missouri does not have a website to provide fast and accurate information about terrorist activities.

Develop a central communication system that will include representatives from the public and private sectors and media. The system should incorporate various communication methods and identify individuals that need to be contacted within various organizations.

2. Missouri has many assets to assist in communicating and educating the public about terrorism. These communication assets can also be used to reassure and educate the public. Unfortunately, Missouri does not use these mediums of communication in an efficient and effective manner.

Thoroughly review the various methods of communication, which include but are not limited to the following:

- a) Use of public libraries,
- b) Donation of advertising space,
- c) Internet via a homeland security website,
- d) Enhanced emergency alert system, and
- e) Radio communication systems.

3. When a disaster happens, everyone wants to assist in some way. Unfortunately the private sector is underutilized because of the lack of communication. The public sector does not have established relationships with private sector industries that may desire to help.

Develop public-private partnerships to address this. Explore the establishment of a program utilizing Memorandums of Understanding with the private sector to provide resources prior to, during, and after a terrorist attack.

4. The inability to communicate quickly and accurately is a detriment to adequately responding to a terrorist attack. Several local governments do not have emergency plans to respond to a terrorist attack or to communicate with other entities about the event. Chapter 44, RSMo, is not clear about a uniform emergency plan.

Develop a comprehensive communications strategy that outlines how a jurisdiction will communicate with other governments, its citizens, and the media during all four phases of emergency management, using a worst-case terrorist attack scenario on that jurisdiction as its benchmark.